A groundbreaking study has raised serious concerns about the vulnerability of US military airfields in the Indo-Pacific in the event of a conflict with China, warning that Chinese missile strikes could severely hinder US operations in the region. Published by the Stimson Center, a noted defense and security think tank, the report suggests urgent upgrades and strategies to bolster US military capabilities.

The analysis reveals that key airfields located within the "first island chain" – a strategic series of islands stretching from Indonesia to Japan, encompassing vital waterways such as the South China Sea – are well within the striking range of thousands of Chinese missiles. If targeted, these installations in Japan could be incapacitated for at least 11.7 days, while locations farther afield, like Guam, could see disruptions lasting around 1.7 days. Alarmingly, the report posits that actual operational delays could extend even longer, particularly if control over aerial refueling operations is lost, critically impacting US air mobility and operational readiness.

The study recommends that the United States urgently invest in a fleet of inexpensive, uncrewed aircraft and enhance runway repair capabilities to ensure resilience against potential strikes. Improving the effectiveness of crewed aircraft that can utilize shorter runways is also highlighted as a vital area for development. Furthermore, the report underscores the necessity of nurturing alliances with neighboring countries, which could facilitate access to additional airfields in times of need.

Despite the growing significance of these findings, US Indo-Pacific Command has so far refrained from commenting on the report. Similarly, China's Ministry of Defence has not responded to inquiries regarding the study's implications.

Historically, US military operations in the region have relied on well-conceived plans for distributed operations, aiming to disperse forces throughout the Indo-Pacific. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative has seen substantial investments—running into hundreds of millions of dollars—aimed at modernizing airbases across various locations, including Australia and Tinian Island.

In addition, the Air Force introduced a program known as Rapid Airfield Damage Recovery (RADR), designed for rapid restoration of airstrip functionality to support sustained military sorties even after an attack. The report does acknowledge the importance of missile defense systems, emphasizing a planned multibillion-dollar "layered" network of interceptors intended to defend critical bases in Guam.

A retired US Air Force logistics officer, with experience in Indo-Pacific conflict simulations, responded to the report, indicating that while he found its analysis generally accurate, he believed RADR and missile defenses could prove more effective than suggested. He also pointed out that it is likely Chinese strategies would involve a more diverse array of weaponry rather than a sole focus on anti-runway more munitions.

The research was propelled by sophisticated statistical modeling, considering critical variables such as the dimensions of runways, the accuracy of Chinese weaponry, and current defensive measures employed by the US.

Kelly Grieco, one of the report's authors, underscored an increasingly prevalent belief among policymakers that the success of the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific hinges significantly on maintaining control of bases in Japan and Guam, particularly in the context of defending Taiwan.

With tensions escalating in the Indo-Pacific and global strategic dynamics shifting rapidly, this report raises critical questions about the preparedness of US military infrastructure. Are we fully equipped to handle the next major conflict in the region? The clock is ticking, and the stakes could not be higher.